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This paper proposes a new Separabilist account of thick concepts, called the Expansion 
View (or EV).  According to EV, thick concepts are expanded contents of thin terms.  An 
expanded content is, roughly, the semantic content of a predicate along with modifiers.  
Although EV is a form of Separabilism, it is distinct from the only kind of Separabilism 
discussed in the literature, and it has many features that Inseparabilists want from an 
account of thick concepts.  EV can also give non-cognitivists a novel escape from the Anti-
Disentangling Argument.  §I explains the approach of all previous Separabilists, and argues 
that there’s no reason for Separabilists to take this approach.  §II explains EV.  §III fends off 
objections.  And §IV explains how non-cognitivist proponents of EV can escape the Anti-
Disentangling Argument. 
 
 
Ethicists often debate whether thick evaluative concepts, like kind, are composed of more fundamental 
concepts, like good.1  Separabilists hold that thick concepts are combinations of more fundamental elements, 
such as thin concepts and non-evaluative concepts.  Inseparabilists, by contrast, claim that thick concepts 
cannot be divided into evaluative and non-evaluative components.   
Separabilists must face an objection.  If thin concepts are incapable of representing properties, as 
many non-cognitivists believe, it appears the thick concept’s non-evaluative content must fully determine 
what property the thick concept represents.  And this implies something problematic—that an outsider 
could know what the thick concept applies to without grasping its evaluative perspective.  This is the Anti-
Disentangling Argument, originating with John McDowell (1981) and advocated by many Inseparabilists. 
This paper proposes a new Separabilist model that’s neutral between cognitivism and non-
cognitivism but can give non-cognitivists a novel escape from the Anti-Disentangling Argument.  §I explains 
the basic approach of all previous Separabilists, and argues that there’s no reason for Separabilists to take 
this approach.  §II explains a different kind of Separabilist model, called the Expansion View (henceforth 
                                                         
1 Italicized expressions refer to concepts; expressions with single-quotes refer to terms.  I assume concepts are the 
semantic contents of terms that express them, and that concepts and semantic contents are on the level of sense rather than 
reference. 
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EV).  EV holds that thick concepts (e.g. kind) are expanded contents of thin terms (e.g. ‘good’).  An 
expanded content is, roughly, the semantic content of a predicate along with modifiers (e.g. ‘good to 
others’).  After objections are addressed, §IV shows that EV gives non-cognitivists a new escape from the 
Anti-Disentangling Argument.  There, it’s proposed that a thin concept can play a role in determining what 
property is represented by its associated thick concept, even if that thin concept doesn’t represent a 
property by itself.  The precedent for this idea comes from semantically incomplete expressions, such as 
‘ready’.  These expressions arguably fail to represent properties, although their contents can play a role in 
determining what properties are represented by expanded contents, such as ready-to-dance.   
EV assumes that at least some thick terms are evaluative as a matter of semantic content.2  EV is 
only meant to hold for these semantically evaluative thick terms.  Henceforth, the labels ‘thick’ and ‘thin’ 
will be reserved for terms and concepts that are semantically evaluative, unless otherwise noted.   
This paper, however, does not argue that EV is true, or more plausible than rival accounts.  It only 
argues that there’s no reason to think EV is false.  This modest claim is nevertheless important.  It reveals 
that there are more ways of understanding thick concepts than both Separabilists and Inseparabilists have 
acknowledged.  As explained in §I, all previous Separabilist models fall under a certain type, called a 
dependence view.  And their Inseparabilist opponents often assume Separabilists should accept a 
dependence view.  But EV is not a dependence view; and the debate between Separabilism and 
Inseparabilism has yet to countenance a model like EV.  So, the modest claim of this paper makes room for 
a different kind of view within a broader debate.  Positive arguments for EV must be discussed elsewhere.   
Although EV is a form of Separabilism, it possesses many features that Inseparabilists want from an 
account of thick concepts.  As we’ll see, EV is consistent with anti-disentangling (§IV), shapelessness 
                                                         
2 Space prohibits discussing this assumption.  Opponents include Väyrynen (2013) and Blackburn (1992).  See Kyle 
(2013a; 2015) for defenses. 
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(§IV.5), the denial of thin centralism (§II.4), the variability of thick terms (§III.2), and the ambivalence of 
thick terms and concepts (§III.2).  
 
I. Dependence Views   
Separabilists hold that thick concepts combine an evaluative content E with a non-evaluative content N.3  
But how exactly are E and N combined?  So far, all Separabilist models have held that E and N are combined 
by a dependence relation.  On Allan Gibbard’s view, E obtains “for” or because of N (1992, 280).4  Stephan 
Burton and Christine Tappolet hold that E obtains “in virtue of some particular instance” of N (Burton 
1992, 31; Tappolet 2004, 216).  Daniel Elstein and Thomas Hurka propose that N “makes anything” that 
has it E (2009, 521).  And Andrew Payne allows that E and N may be interdependent—E obtains “in virtue 
of” N’s obtaining, while E’s obtaining can also be a “reason for” N (2005, 93).  Let’s call these dependence 
views.  The defining feature of dependence views is that they require each thick concept to contain some 
conceptual component that represents a dependence relation (e.g. the concept in-virtue-of).5   
All previous Separabilist models classify as dependence views.  Indeed, their Inseparabilist 
opponents often assume Separabilists should accept a dependence view.  Jonathan Dancy writes 
A regrettably lewd action is not of such and such a sort, and bad; it is bad for being of that sort.  
All should accept that the evaluation is linked to the description in this way; we are not dealing 
here with a mere conjunction (2013, 45). 
 
Another Inseparabilist, Debbie Roberts, lays out the groundwork for Separabilism as follows: 
[A]n analysis that was merely conjunctive would not capture an aspect of what is conveyed by 
‘tactful’: that it is due to its being T that the action is good.  Thus, a two-component analysis of 
‘tactful’ would have to say something like: “x is tactful if and only if x is T and is good in virtue 
of being T.”  (2011, 496). 
 
                                                         
3 Some views allow N to embed thin concepts (e.g. Elstein and Hurka 2009).  EV does as well. 
4 On his view, the evaluative content is the warranting of a certain feeling (e.g. shame) which is warranted “for” the fact 
that certain non-evaluative contents obtain. 
5 Dependence views are not explicit about whether the dependence relation between E and N is necessary or 
contingent, conceptual or metaphysical, etc. 
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Both Dancy and Roberts assume Separabilists should accept a dependence view.  And their assumption is 
not idle.  As I note in §IV.2, Roberts relies on this assumption to show that some Separabilist views are 
vulnerable to the Anti-Disentangling Argument. 
In this section, I argue against the prevailing assumption that Separabilists should accept a 
dependence view.  I do not argue that dependence views are false; I only argue that Separabilists have no 
reason to accept a dependence view.  In particular, I argue that Separabilists have no reason to think every 
thick concept contains a conceptual component that represents a dependence relation.  Let’s consider four 
potential reasons, which all fail. 
A first reason may stem from Roberts’ suggestion that a dependence relation is an “aspect of what is 
conveyed” by the term; the thick term conveys “that it is due to its being T that the action is good” (2011, 
496).  This claim is not obviously so.  Even if it’s true, one must establish that the conveyed dependence 
relation is represented by some component of the thick concept.  But there are many other ways for this 
information to be conveyed.  For example, it might be conveyed pragmatically, or it might be entailed by 
the thick concept without being a component of that concept (just as colored is entailed by red without being 
a component of red).  Roberts’ suggestion doesn’t rule out these possibilities, and so doesn’t establish that 
each thick concept contains a component that represents a dependence relation. 
A second argument might assume a dependence constraint such as (DC): it is conceptually true that 
x is good only if x is good in virtue of some property N (Zangwill 2006, 270; Roberts 2017, 216).  (DC) 
forges a conceptual connection between the concept in-virtue-of and the concept good.  Now suppose that 
good is a component of kind, as Separabilists may hold.  From these assumptions, it may appear to follow (by 
transitivity) that in-virtue-of is also a component of kind.  This conclusion, however, does not follow.  To 
appeal to transitivity, the argument needs another premise—that in-virtue-of is a component of good.  But 
it’s controversial that good has any components.  And more importantly, this extra premise is not supported 
by (DC).  There are conceptual truths involving goodness that don’t specify components of good, just as 
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there are conceptual truths involving redness that don’t specify components of red (e.g. redness is a color).  
And (DC) is appears to be the sort of conceptual truth that doesn’t specify a component of good.  After all, 
if good contained good-in-virtue-of-N as a component, then good would be a component of itself, which is 
arguably impossible.   
To be sure, we could state the dependence constraint in terms of kindness, rather than goodness.  
Consider (DC*): it is conceptually true that x is kind only if x is kind in virtue of some property N.  This 
constraint also doesn’t entail that in-virtue-of is a component of kind.  Again, there are conceptual truths 
involving kindness that don’t specify components of kind.  And (DC*) is surely among them, because kind-
in-virtue-of-N cannot be a component of kind.  Thus, dependence constraints like (DC) and (DC*) do not 
entail a dependence view of thick concepts, even if we assume Separabilism.6 
A third argument for dependence views might stem from the reductive nature of Separabilism.  (1) 
An account of thick concepts is not Separabilist unless it’s reductive.  But (2) such an account is not 
reductive unless it reduces a thick concept’s evaluative element to something non-evaluative.  And (3) the 
reduction of this evaluative element requires the specification of a dependence relation.  So, Separabilism 
requires the specification of a dependence relation.  However, (2) is false.  Separabilism need only be 
reductive in the sense that it reduces a thick concept to evaluative and non-evaluative contents that are 
more fundamental than the thick concept itself—call this Weak Separabilism.  A stronger form of 
Separabilism would also require that these constituent contents be expressible without thick terms—call 
this Strong Separabilism.7  Either way, Separabilism need not reduce a thick concept’s evaluative element to 
something non-evaluative (Väyrynen 2016, sec. 3).  This is the aim of many cognitivist and non-cognitivist 
theories, but not Separabilism per se.     
                                                         
6 The same basic problems would arise if these constraints were framed in terms of supervenience, rather than 
dependence (although supervenience is not technically a dependence relation). 
7 Most Separabilists are Strong Separabilists.  Tappolet is a Weak Separabilist—she reduces concepts like courage to 
affective concept like admirable (2004, 216), and assumes that affective concepts are thick (211). 
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A fourth argument may stem from the failure of a simpler model, where E and N are combined by 
mere conjunction.  Suppose we hold that brutal is the mere conjunction of bad and causing-pain-aggressively.  
These evaluative and non-evaluative contents can obtain coincidentally, without the act being brutal.  
Imagine that a physician aggressively causes pain by resetting a broken leg.  Such an act would not ordinarily 
count as bad or brutal.  But suppose the physician is breaking a promise to an irrelevant third party in 
resetting the patient’s leg.  Here the act of aggressively causing pain could be bad without being brutal.  The 
conjunctive model has trouble excluding such coincidences.  But dependence views can exclude them—the 
badness of a brutal act must somehow depend on the aggressive causing of pain, but the badness of the 
physician’s act depends on the breaking of a promise.8   
However, the ability to solve this problem supports dependence views only if no other model can 
solve it as effectively.  And notice that we can explain why the promise-breaking physician’s act isn’t brutal 
without even referencing a dependence relation—roughly, brutality requires being bad to someone, but the 
promise-breaking physician isn’t being bad to the patient or anyone else.9  As we’ll see in §II.3, EV can 
provide this sort of explanation.  We will also see that there’s no general reason to think coincidences can 
present problems for EV. 
A final reason for dependence views may stem from their putative ability to escape the Anti-
Disentangling Argument (e.g. Elstein and Hurka 2009; Burton 1992).  But §IV shows that EV can also 
escape this argument.  So, we’re left to wonder why Separabilists should accept a dependence view rather 
than some alternative model. 
 
 
 
                                                         
8 For additional discussion on such coincidences, see Kyle (2013b). 
9 More precisely, she’s not being bad to anyone aggressively—see §II.3. 
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II. Expansion View 
EV holds that thick concepts are expanded contents of thin terms.  This section first distinguishes thin from 
thick, highlights some key thin terms that are useful for EV, and then explains expanded contents.  Finally, 
instances of EV are sketched and discussed. 
 
II.1. Thin Terms.  Thick and thin are technical notions that rarely get distinguished in theoretically neutral 
ways (Eklund 2011, 26-8; Väyrynen 2016, §5; Kyle 2016, §4).  It’s beyond the scope of this paper to reject 
rival ways of drawing the distinction.  The following is merely an explanation of how it should be 
understood for the purposes of EV.   
The basic idea is that thick concepts require competent users to recognize an entailment to a 
logically weaker evaluative concept, whereas thin concepts do not require this.  We can define logical 
weakness for concepts just as logicians define logical weakness for formulas (e.g. Tomassi 1999, 83).  
Accordingly, a concept C1 is logically weaker than C2 if and only if C2 entails C1 but not vice-versa.10  This 
definition is assumed in the following necessary condition for thickness.  For any semantically evaluative 
concept T,  
T is a thick concept only if there is a logically weaker evaluative concept E such that, necessarily, 
whoever fully grasps T believes that x is T only if x is E.11 
 
We can see that paradigmatic thick concepts satisfy this condition by considering conceptual-defectiveness 
judgments.  If Sue believes that x is kind and that x is not good to anyone, then Sue must have a deficient 
grasp of kind—in this case, the relevant E is good-to-someone.  If Jane believes that x is admirable and that x is 
not worthy of anything, then Jane must have a defective grasp of admirable—here, the relevant E is worthy-
                                                         
10 Logical weakness helps to capture one sense in which a particular thin concept like good is more general than certain 
thick concepts like kind—the former is logically weaker, and so has a wider extension, than the latter.  However, ethicists likely 
mean something else when they construe thin versus thick in terms of general versus specific.  Thanks to an anonymous reviewer 
for pointing this out. 
11 This condition can be weakened by replacing ‘believes’ with ‘is disposed to believe’.   
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of-something.  And if Max believes that x is loyal and that x is not true to anything, then Max has a deficient 
grasp of loyal—here, true-to-something is the relevant E.12   
What then are thin terms and concepts?  For our purposes, a thin concept is any semantically 
evaluative concept that fails the above necessary condition for thickness.  A thin term is a single word whose 
semantic content is a thin concept.  And a thick term is a single word whose semantic content is a thick 
concept.   
In principle, EV could appeal to many different thin terms (e.g. ‘obligated’, ‘permitted’, etc.).  But 
this paper focuses on a small sample of thin terms that are particularly useful for EV.  These are featured as 
predicates in the following sentences:  
(1) Jane is good. 
(2) Sue is worthy. 
(3) Max has been true.13 
 
These predicates also have antonyms—‘bad’, ‘unworthy’, and ‘untrue’.  All claims about ‘good’, ‘worthy’, 
and ‘true’ apply similarly to their antonyms.   
It’s clear that ‘good’ and ‘worthy’ are thin terms, by our definition.  Focus on worthy: the evaluative 
concept good-in-a-way might be logically weaker than worthy, assuming Judith Thomson is right that 
everything is good in some way or other (2008, 10).  But one need not evince a deficient grasp of worthy by 
thinking that Sue is worthy and is not good in any way.  One could easily think this if one believes that Sue 
is worthy of blame.  The same strategy can be employed for any evaluative concept that’s logically weaker 
than worthy.  
It’s worth pausing on (3).  ‘True’ is plausibly an evaluative term, at least given its meaning in (3).  
It’s normally positive to say that Max has been true and negative to say that he’s been untrue.  It’s also 
                                                         
12 I argue that ‘true’ is evaluative below.  It’s worth noting that ‘true’ is not coextensive with ‘loyal’.  One can be true 
to almost anything, but there are substantive restrictions on what one can be loyal to—e.g. one could be true to one’s emotions, 
but not loyal to one’s emotions.   
13 (3) is stated in the perfect tense (i.e. ‘has been true’), because this is more natural when ‘true’ is applied to a person. 
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useful to contrast (3) with ‘Max has been firm’.  Although similar in meaning, the latter is neutral whereas 
(3) typically expresses something positive.14  One might object that even non-evaluative sentences can 
express something positive—for example, ‘Max is happy’ expresses a positive state of affairs.  However, 
‘Max is happy’ doesn’t express approval of Max.  Neither does ‘Max has been firm’.  (3), by contrast, 
expresses approval of Max, much like how (1) expresses approval of Jane.  And this is a crucial mark of an 
evaluative term.   
Of course, it seems possible for speakers to use ‘true’ to express a negative evaluation.  Seeing that 
Max didn’t turn against his crime boss, the police might express their frustration as follows—“Dammit! 
Max has been true.”15  But the same goes for paradigmatic evaluative terms, like ‘excellent’.  Knowing that 
we cannot defeat the Lakers when Lebron is playing well, we might say—“Dammit! Lebron has been 
excellent this game.”  This suggests that uses of both ‘true’ and ‘excellent’ can be variable in evaluative 
valence.  But this is compatible with them being evaluative terms.  Pekka Väyrynen has successfully argued 
that the variability of an expression doesn’t preclude it from being semantically evaluative (2011).16   
Furthermore, it’s plausible that ‘true’ is a thin term by our definition, because true fails the 
necessary condition on thickness.  Most likely, good-in-a-way is logically weaker than true.  But one need not 
evince a deficient grasp of true by thinking that Max has been true and is not good in any way.  One could 
think this if one believes that Max has been true to an evil cause.  Moreover, the fact that one can be true to 
an evil cause is compatible with the claim that true is a thin concept.  The concept true operates similar to 
                                                         
14 In addition to evaluative differences, ‘true’ and ‘firm’ also differ in extension.  It’s possible to be firm in something 
without being true to that thing.  A dishonest car salesman might be firm in a particular deal, without being true to that deal, 
because he fails to uphold his end of the bargain.  One can also be true to something without being firm (or unwavering).  
Suppose Max is only true to his emotions.  If his emotions fluctuate constantly, he might be quite erratic, and thus hard to classify 
as firm or unwavering.   
15 Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for the example, and for pressing this objection. 
16 I cannot here provide a complete argument for the claim that ‘true’ is semantically evaluative.  Suffice it to say that 
‘true’ is just as likely to be semantically evaluative as any paradigmatic thick or thin term.  Any argument against the claim that 
‘true’ is semantically evaluative would be an equally plausible argument against taking ‘courageous’ or ‘good’ to be semantically 
evaluative.  Roberts (2015, 912-3) points out that Väyrynen’s arguments for the pragmatic view over-generate by showing that 
even ‘good’ isn’t semantically evaluative. 
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good in this regard.  Clearly one can be good to an evil person, and good is the paradigm of thin concepts.  A 
similar point applies to the word ‘true’: the fact that ‘true’ has variable uses doesn’t preclude it from being 
a thin term.  Expressions like ‘good liar’ suggest that thin terms like ‘good’ can also have variable uses.  And 
Simon Kirchin has recently argued that various other thin terms are variable (2017, 133).  I return to 
variability in §III.2. 
One might object that ‘true’ is not thin, because it’s not wholly evaluative.  But the present 
distinction between thick and thin doesn’t require the thin to be wholly evaluative.  And there’s no reason 
to require this.  It’s often asserted that thin terms are wholly evaluative, but the assertion is never supported 
by argument, and has been challenged on independent grounds (e.g. Väyrynen 2013, 7).  Even non-
cognitivists can deny that thin terms are wholly evaluative.  A thin term can be incapable of representing a 
property, in accord with traditional non-cognitivism, even if it has non-evaluative content.17  Indeed, the 
earliest known distinction between thick and thin comes from a non-cognitivist—R.M. Hare—who plainly 
assumes that all thin terms have non-evaluative content (1952, 121; 1963, 25).  And Hare is a main target 
of the Anti-Disentangling Argument.  We will therefore not assume that thin terms are wholly evaluative.   
The above distinction between thick and thin cannot be given a complete defense here.  The 
important point is that it at least provides a principled distinction between ‘good’, ‘worthy’, and ‘true’, on 
the one hand, and paradigmatic thick terms, on the other.  Without a complete defense, we can simply take 
the definition of a thin term as a stipulation that plays a key role in EV.  Those who object to this use of 
‘thin’ can simply replace ‘thin’ with another technical term, defined in the same way.  This would make no 
difference for EV. 
 
                                                         
17 The label ‘descriptive’ requires an aptness for representing properties, but ‘non-evaluative’ does not.  Partly non-
evaluative concepts can fail to represent properties. 
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II.2. Expanded Contents.  Corresponding to any predicate P, there are innumerable complex expressions 
that result merely from adding modifiers to P.  Regarding ‘good’, there are expressions like ‘good at 
dancing’, ‘good with children’, ‘good to others’, etc.  The same goes for non-evaluative predicates.  
Corresponding to ‘ready’, there are expressions like ‘ready to dance’, ‘ready for work’, etc.  The semantic 
contents of these complex expressions are expanded contents of ‘good’ and ‘ready’ respectively.  Expanded 
contents are defined as follows: For any predicate P and any concept C, 
C is an expanded content of P if and only if there is a possible expression P* such that P* results 
merely from adding modifiers to P and C would be the semantic content of P*. 
 
Expanded contents always contain extra contents that are not determined solely by the associated predicate.  
These extra contents will be displayed in brackets—e.g. good-[at-dancing].18  
There are indefinitely many expanded contents for a given predicate, one for each possible 
combination of possible modifiers.  An expanded content of, say, ‘good’ need not be expressible within any 
actual language.  It only needs to be expressible in some possible language that contains ‘good’ with its 
actual meaning.   
Among others, EV focuses on good+modifier phrases—complex phrases where ‘good’ is modified 
by other expressions (e.g. ‘good to others’).  It is uncontroversial that some such phrases contain 
occurrences of ‘good’ that are logically attributive (Almotahari and Hosein 2015, 1488; Peace 2017, 2992-
3).  That is, some sentences of the form ‘A is good+modifier’ are not equivalent to the conjunction of ‘A is 
good’ with a sentence that captures the modifier.  For instance, ‘A is good at dancing’ is not equivalent to 
‘A is good’ and ‘A can dance’—otherwise absurdities would result (Szabó 2001, sec. 3).  EV fully accords 
with this uncontroversial claim, and can appeal to it in defense against objections (see §III.1).19  But EV is 
                                                         
18 Expanded contents are defined for predicates in the grammatical sense only, not the logical sense.  As I note below, it 
is uncontroversial that some occurrences of ‘good’ are logically attributive.  But this allows that ‘good’ can occur as a predicate in 
the grammatical sense.  Geach agrees (1956, 34). 
19 ‘Good’ need not change in meaning when modifiers are added to ‘Jane is good’.  When this sentence is uttered 
during Jane’s dance performance, its occurrence of ‘good’ can have the same semantic content that it has in the longer sentence 
‘Jane is good at dancing’. 
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not committed to the controversial thesis that every occurrence of ‘good’ is logically attributive, or to the 
thesis that there is no concept or property of goodness-simpliciter (Geach 1956, 33-6; Thomson 2008, chs. 
1-2).  As far as EV is concerned, there might be some logically predicative occurrences of ‘good’ (e.g. 
‘Pleasure is good’), and these occurrences might express good-simpliciter and represent the corresponding 
property. 
 
II.3. Examples.  Now consider three general categories of thick concepts that can be construed as expanded 
contents of thin terms. 
First consider affective concepts like admirable, respectable, laughable, untrustworthy, and blameworthy.  
Along with Tappolet, we can assume affective concepts are thick (2004, 211).  EV treats them as expanded 
contents of ‘worthy’ or ‘unworthy’, which take the following general forms—worthy-[of-something] or 
unworthy-[of-something].  For example, admirable is an expanded content of ‘worthy’, namely worthy-[of-
admiration].  And untrustworthy is an expanded content of ‘unworthy’, namely unworthy-[of-trust].  This is a 
natural view of affective concepts, and EV accounts for other thick concepts in a similar way.   
Second, consider thick concepts like integrity, faithful, courageous, loyal, cowardly, betrayal, and 
perfidious.  These will be called commitment-concepts.  A commitment concept is an expanded content of 
‘true’ or ‘untrue’.  They have the following general forms—true-[to-something-in-some-way] or untrue-[to-
something-in-some-way].  For instance, courageous is an expanded content of ‘true’, something like true-[to-a-
good-cause-despite-risk].  And cowardly is an expanded content of ‘untrue’, something like untrue-[to-a-good-
cause-because-of-risk].   
And third, consider thick concepts like benevolent, kind, generous, munificent, malevolent, nasty, rude, 
brutal, and cruel.  These will be called treatment-concepts.  According to EV, treatment concepts are 
expanded contents of ‘good’ or ‘bad’.  And these expanded contents have the following general forms—
good-[to-someone-in-some-way] or bad-[to-someone-in-some-way].  For example, kind is an expanded content of 
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‘good’, something like good-[to-someone-as-an-end].  And brutal is an expanded content of ‘bad’, something 
like bad-[to-someone-aggressively].20  This account of brutal explains why the promise-breaking physician’s act 
is not brutal—resetting the broken leg is not bad to anyone aggressively.  
The promise-breaking physician was meant to illustrate the coincidental application of a thick 
concept’s evaluative and non-evaluative contents.  There’s no reason to think coincidences could present 
problems for EV.  Consider the account of brutal.  The non-evaluative content to-someone-aggressively is the 
content of a modifier; it therefore cannot apply unless it’s combined with the content of another 
expression.  It’s thus unclear how this non-evaluative content could obtain coincidentally with bad.  Of 
course, it’s possible to combine this non-evaluative content with some other concept—e.g. speaks-[to-
someone-aggressively].  And it could be a mere coincidence that this combined concept applies to the same 
person as bad.  But this coincidence doesn’t require the application of the concept bad-[to-someone-
aggressively] (i.e. brutal).  An actress may speak to someone aggressively, while displaying bad acting, but 
that doesn’t mean she’s being bad to someone aggressively.  So, there’s no reason to think EV has problems 
with coincidence.   
The above analyses are merely provisional sketches aimed at illustrating the general resources of 
EV.  These sketches may only be rough approximations of what would result from serious conceptual 
analysis, if EV were true.  EV is not committed to these examples.  Elstein and Hurka qualify their analyses 
in the same way (2009, 531).  Any Separabilist would do the same. 
Nevertheless, it’s useful to see how one such analysis can be explained and briefly defended.  
Consider the analysis of kind as good-[to-someone-as-an-end].  As noted earlier, kind action requires that the 
                                                         
20 ‘Brutal’ is ambiguous.  We often speak of brutal criticism and brutal weather, where the adjective ‘brutal’ is 
synonymous with ‘harsh’.  But the concept analyzed in this paper is different, and is rather expressed by talk of brutal beatings, 
bombings, etc., where ‘harsh’ is not an apt synonym.  Consider also the noun ‘brutality’—we wouldn’t say that cold weather 
and harsh criticisms are examples of brutality, but we would say this about beatings, bombings, etc.  The concept analyzed in this 
paper corresponds to both the noun and the adjective.  Finally, the ambiguity of ‘brutal’ is typically indicated in lexical entries, 
and is supported by ambiguity tests, such as the ellipsis test—the sentence ‘His critiques are brutal, and so are his beatings’ is 
anomalous, much like ‘John’s license expired, and so did John’. 
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act be good to someone.21  But there are many ways of being good to someone.  On the present analysis, 
the relevant way is specified by the phrase ‘as an end’—this phrase concerns the agent’s intention.  At the 
very least, an action is good to Mary as an end only if the agent intends to be good to Mary.  So, an action 
isn’t kind if it’s good to someone purely by accident or as a side-effect.  Furthermore, an action is good to 
Mary as an end only if the agent is not intending to be good to her merely as a means.  Suppose I am 
intentionally good to Mary, but I have this intention solely because I desire to produce another end.  In this 
case, I’m being good to her merely as a means, not as an end, and so am not acting kindly towards her.22  As 
indicated, kindness depends heavily on intention—in addition to being good to someone, one must intend 
to do so, and not merely as a means to another end.  Oftentimes, we ascribe kindness when we presume the 
agent has this intention but rescind the label if we learn the intention was absent.23  The present account 
explains why. 
Most likely this analysis will be criticized for being too strong—it appears to exclude intuitively 
kind acts from being kind.  For example, one might intuit that it’s possible to act kindly towards Mary by 
being good to her merely as a means, or as a side-effect.  But this sort of intuition can be explained away.  
We may be inclined to call such acts ‘kind’ because denying their kindness would imply something false—
that the acts are unkind.  This implication from ‘not kind’ to ‘unkind’ isn’t an entailment, since many 
actions are neither kind nor unkind (e.g. opening a cabinet).  It’s rather a conversational implicature known 
as negative-strengthening.  When a negation is combined with certain words, like ‘happy’, this combination 
conversationally implicates a stronger claim involving the word’s antonym (Levinson 2000, 127ff).  For 
instance, ‘A is not happy’ conversationally implicates that A is unhappy.  And plausibly, ‘A is not kind’ 
                                                         
21 Acceptance of this is required for full competence with kind.  Failed attempts at being good to someone are not 
examples of kindness.  If I try to be good to Mary, but fail, at best I’ve only tried to be kind to her. 
22 Mixed intentions are possible—I can be good to her as an end and as a means, provided I’m not intending to be good 
to her solely because of some other end. 
23 Refusing to rescind the label may be due to politeness or fear that the agent will revoke bestowed benefits.  It may 
also be due to the pragmatic mechanism discussed next. 
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conversationally implicates that A is unkind.  Returning to the abovementioned acts, it’s clear that these 
acts are not unkind, since they are good to Mary.  So, our denial of kindness in these cases would have a 
false implicature.  Our desire to avoid this implicature can mislead us into ascribing kindness to an act that 
lacks this feature.   
The strategy just outlined can be used to defend other analyses that appear too strong.  When 
negative-strengthening implicatures are false, they can mislead us into thinking the target thick concept 
applies when in fact it doesn’t.  In Kyle (2017, §6), I argue this happens regarding courage. 
Unfortunately, I cannot explore all sample analyses here.  And it’s possible that some may turn out 
implausible upon closer inspection.  In that case, we can hope to reformulate them.  What if we’re unable 
to state a plausible reformulation?  In §III.3, I argue that this still wouldn’t establish the falsity of EV. 
 
II.4. General Features.  All the above examples fall under one of three general categories—affective 
concepts, commitment concepts, and treatment concepts.  These categories are not exhaustive.  There 
could be other categories involving expanded contents like good-[for-someone], good-[at-something], good-
[with-something], good-[qua-K], true-[as-a-K], and so on.  EV could also make use of other thin terms, such as 
‘obligated’ and ‘permitted’.  EV can be extended well beyond three categories.   
Indeed, EV may be an instance of a general phenomenon that holds for non-evaluative concepts.  
For example, the non-evaluative concept ripe is plausibly an expanded content of ‘ready’, something like 
ready-[to-use-and-consume].  It is not implausible that instances of EV have analogues among non-evaluative 
terms.   
How are evaluative and non-evaluative contents combined within a thick concept?  According to 
EV, this just is the relationship between a thin term’s content (e.g. good) and the content of its modifiers 
(e.g. to-others).  Unlike dependence views, EV explains this relationship without mentioning any 
dependence relations.   
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EV’s silence about dependence relations makes it distinct from any dependence view.  As noted in 
§I, dependence views require every thick concept to contain a conceptual component that represents a 
dependence relation.  EV does not require every thick concept to contain such a component.  According to 
EV, a thick concept is simply an expanded content of a thin term; these expanded contents needn’t contain 
dependence concepts.24  EV is therefore not a dependence view.   
To be clear, EV does not prohibit thick concepts from containing dependence concepts.  Recall that 
cowardly was analyzed as untrue-[to-a-good-cause-because-of-risk]—the concept because is a dependence 
concept.  So, a thin term’s expanded contents can in principle contain dependence concepts.  The 
difference is just that EV doesn’t require this sort of analysis whereas dependence views do.  On EV, the 
question of whether a thick concept contains a dependence concept is answerable only on a case-by-case 
basis, solely by reflecting on the content of that particular thick concept.   
What if it turns out, upon reflection, that all plausible instances of EV involve dependence 
concepts, much like the analysis of cowardly?  The first thing to note is that EV still wouldn’t be a 
dependence view, because EV doesn’t require this outcome whereas dependence views do require it.  The 
second thing is that it’s unreasonable to expect this outcome—i.e. there’s no reason to think all plausible 
instances of EV will involve dependence concepts.  One potential reason would be an argument for a 
dependence view; but we saw in §I that no such arguments work.  Alternatively, we could argue in a 
piecemeal fashion: for each analysis that doesn’t contain dependence terms, we could try to paraphrase it in 
a way that does contain such terms.  For example, we could paraphrase ‘bad to someone aggressively’ as 
‘bad to someone because of one’s aggressiveness’.  Regardless of whether this particular paraphrase is 
accurate, we cannot assume this strategy will work in every case.  This is because we cannot assume, from 
the outset, that every such paraphrase will express the same concept as the original phrase.  Since 
                                                         
24 If there’s no dependence concept within the thin term’s semantic content or the modifier’s content, then there 
needn’t be one in the thin term’s expanded content either. 
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dependence terms are extensionally relevant, the addition of dependence terms can change the extension of 
the whole expression, thereby making the paraphrase express a different concept from the original phrase.25  
And, for all we know, the original phrase might express the target thick concept (e.g. brutal) while the 
paraphrase does not.  So, although EV allows that some of its analyses will involve dependence concepts, 
there’s no reason to expect that all of them will. 
Despite its silence on dependence relations, EV allows that thick properties may depend and/or 
supervene upon non-evaluative properties.  On EV, the claim that kindness depends/supervenes on the 
non-evaluative is equivalent to the claim that being-good-to-someone-as-an-end depends/supervenes on the 
non-evaluative.  These claims are equally plausible, and they might even be conceptual truths, as far as EV is 
concerned.  Conceptual truths of this sort do not entail a dependence view of thick concepts, as was shown 
in §I.  
EV is also compatible with the view that thin evaluations can depend upon thick ones (Dancy 2004, 
84).  For example, it’s plausible that an action’s wrongness can depend upon its brutality.  On EV, this 
amounts to saying that the act’s wrongness depends on its being bad to someone aggressively—and the 
concept bad-[to-someone-aggressively] is a thick concept.  So, the application of a thin concept can depend on 
the application of a thick one.   
Some might worry that EV is not really a form of Separabilism.  But this is a mistake.  Notice that 
Inseparabilists cannot accept EV.  EV requires that thick concepts are composed of thin ones.  And this 
claim is not compatible with Inseparabilism (Roberts 2011, 518).   
Of course, Separabilism is more than just the denial of Inseparabilism.  It’s also a reductive theory, 
which can be construed in two ways.  Weak Separabilism merely reduces a thick concept to evaluative and 
non-evaluative contents that are more fundamental than the thick concept itself.  Strong Separabilism 
                                                         
25 Even if the two phrases are coextensive, they still may not express the same concept (e.g. ‘water’ and ‘H2O’). 
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requires that these constituent contents be expressible without thick terms.  What kind of Separabilism is 
EV?  Consider the initial statement:  
Expansion View 
Thick concepts are expanded contents of thin terms. 
 
This is only a form of Weak Separabilism, because it allows that the relevant expanded contents may only 
be expressible with (other) thick terms.  For example, it allows us to analyze malevolent as bad-[to-others-
with-malice], even if ‘malice’ is a thick term.  Weak Separabilism owes us an account of these embedded 
thick terms (e.g. Tappolet 2004, 217-18).  Fortunately, EV can be transformed into Strong Separabilism 
merely by adding another claim: 
Supplement 
And these expanded contents are expressible without thick terms, at least in principle.   
 
If ‘malice’ is thick, then, according to Supplement, we should be able to modify the above analysis of 
malevolent so that ‘malice’ is not used to express the analysans (e.g. bad-[to-others-with-intent-to-inflict-
unnecessary-harm]).  Since Strong Separabilism is harder to defend, let’s assume EV is combined with 
Supplement.  There’s no guarantee that this form of Strong Separabilism is true, but we can examine 
whether there’s reason to think it’s false.  §III.3 discusses various objections. 
Even though EV requires that thin concepts are constituent parts of thick concepts, it does not 
require thin centralism—the view that thin concepts are conceptually prior to thick ones (Hurley 1989, 
11).  On the most common interpretation, thin centralism requires that it be possible to grasp a thin 
concept without grasping any thick concepts.  But we can deny this requirement, as far as EV is concerned.  
In particular, EV allows that thin concepts like good cannot be grasped without grasping some specific 
concept such as good-[to-someone], good-[at-dancing], good-[with-children], etc.26  EV also allows that these 
specific concepts are thick, since they are expanded contents of ‘good’.  So, as far as EV is concerned, it 
                                                         
26 This view of good appears in Thomson (2008) and Geach (1956).  It does not entail their controversial claim that 
there’s no such thing as good-simpliciter, since good-simpliciter might be an abstraction from the specific concepts. 
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might be impossible to grasp good without grasping some thick concept or other.  EV therefore does not 
require thin centralism.    
Some Inseparabilists understand the relation between thick and thin as analogous to the 
determinate-determinable relation (e.g. Harcourt and Thomas 2013, 25).  This idea is also compatible with 
EV.  If there are any determinates of good, then the following expanded contents would clearly be among 
them: good-[to-someone], good-[at-dancing], etc.  And, again, EV allows that these concepts are thick.  So, it 
allows that thick concepts might be determinates of some determinable thin concept.   
 
III. Objections 
III.1. Unwanted Entailments.  If EV were true, wouldn’t thick concepts have unwanted entailments?  Take 
the account of kind as good-[to-someone-as-an-end].  One might worry that this account entails that kindness is 
always a good thing—a claim that has obvious counterexamples.  Imagine a Nazi sympathizer who makes 
tea for a weary Nazi soldier in order to revitalize him.  The sympathizer’s action is not a good thing, but we 
can assume it’s kind.   
Is this counterexample a problem for the analysis of kind as good-[to-someone-as-an-end]?  No.  It 
would only be a problem if we assumed the following premise—that being good to someone as an end is 
always a good thing.  But the sympathizer case is equally a counterexample to this premise; it’s easy to 
imagine that the sympathizer is being good to the Nazi as an end.  Furthermore, there’s no reason to assume 
the above premise would be true.  As noted earlier, it’s highly plausible that some good+modifier phrases 
are logically attributive.  We thus have no reason to assume that every sentence of the form ‘A is 
good+modifier’ entails that A is a good thing.  At best, this sort of entailment holds on a case-by-case basis.  
And the sympathizer example reveals that it does not hold in the present case—‘A is good to someone as an 
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end’ does not entail that A is a good thing.  Thus, the analysis of kind does not require that kindness is 
always a good thing.27 
 
III.2. Variability and Ambivalence.  Plausibly, the evaluations of thick terms can exhibit two unique 
features—variability and ambivalence.  Does EV allow thick terms to have these features?   
Roughly, an evaluative expression is variable if it can be used to evaluate positively in some 
contexts but negatively in others (Väyrynen 2011, 3).  Examples include ‘frugal’ and ‘tidy’.  Since EV 
accounts for thick terms with seemingly invariable expressions, like ‘good’, one might think EV requires 
that thick terms are also invariable.  But this is a mistake.  EV is consistent with the variability of thick 
terms.28  Notice that variability can be exhibited by the modifier phrases employed by EV.  Although 
expressions of the form ‘good to X’ and ‘true to X’ are normally positive, they can be used negatively.  If 
we assume that X is a tyrant, you could rightly criticize me as being good to X or true to X.  Or consider 
expressions of the form ‘worthy of X’.  The phrase ‘worthy of laughter’ is positive when applied to 
something intended to provoke laughter (e.g. a joke), but negative when applied to something not so 
intended (e.g. an offer to buy your home).  So, the modifier phrases employed by EV can exhibit 
variability.       
Thick terms also display ambivalence.  An ambivalent expression is, roughly, an evaluative 
expression that can sometimes be used to evaluate without a clear positive or negative valence.  Potential 
examples include ‘suave’ and ‘macabre’ (Kirchin 2013, 75).  But ambivalence can also be exhibited by the 
modifier phrases employed by EV.  Consider the expression ‘worthy of intrigue’.  This expression has 
                                                         
27 One may worry that this approach excludes kind from being a moral or ethical concept.  But this worry arises from 
the sympathizer case alone, regardless of EV.  If moral/ethical concepts must entail good-thing, then the sympathizer case shows 
that kind is not a moral/ethical concept, regardless of EV.  Of course, EV’s analysis of kind is not excluded by other accounts of 
moral/ethical concepts—e.g. involving harms and benefits, other-regardingness, impartiality, universalizability, etc.  
28 Linguistic explanations of variability cannot be discussed here.  For this, see Väyrynen (2011).  Väyrynen also shows 
that the variability of comparative constructions (e.g. ‘too tidy’) is not due to the thick term itself, but to the comparatives.  This 
discussion focuses solely on the variability of expressions in their positive forms. 
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clearly positive uses, as when it’s applied to wine.  It also has clearly negative uses—Thomas Jefferson once 
criticized a life-long presidential office as being “worthy of intrigue.”29  But it can also be used ambivalently.  
Suppose I’m unsure about whether a certain financial opportunity is a scam or a smart investment.  In this 
case, I might say it’s worthy of intrigue, without providing a clear positive or negative assessment.  What 
about expressions of the form ‘good to X’ and ‘true to X’?  These too can be used ambivalently, provided 
it’s unclear whether we should have a positive or negative view about X.  In short, the modifier phrases 
employed by EV can also exhibit ambivalence.                  
Some take the ambivalence of evaluative expressions to support a claim about evaluative content—
namely “that evaluative content itself can come in more varieties than pro and con.”  According to Simon 
Kirchin, this claim conflicts with Separabilism (2013, 74-5).  However, EV is a Separabilist view that does 
not assume thick concepts must be either positive or negative.30  To see why, let’s assume that ‘worthy’ 
always expresses a positive evaluative concept when used by itself.  This assumption doesn’t entail that all 
expanded contents of ‘worthy’ are positive—worthy-[of-blame] isn’t positive.  It also doesn’t entail that all 
expanded contents of ‘worthy’ are negative—worthy-[of-admiration] isn’t negative.  And without the initial 
assumption, there’s no reason why all expanded contents of ‘worthy’ must have either a positive or a 
negative valence.  Since expanded contents of ‘worthy’ are thick concepts, on EV, we therefore have no 
reason to claim that every thick concept must have either a positive or negative valence.  To put this in 
another way: it’s clear that a modifier’s content can reverse a thin concept’s evaluative valence when the 
two are combined—worthy-[of-blame] is just one example.  Why then couldn’t a modifier’s content alter 
that evaluation so that it’s neither pro nor con?  EV doesn’t preclude this from happening. 
 
                                                         
29 See <http://www.let.rug.nl/usa/presidents/thomas-jefferson/letters-of-thomas-jefferson/jefl65.php>, accessed 
4/3/2019. 
30 We do need to explain how a content can be evaluative without being positive or negative.  Assume this can be done 
for present purposes.   
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III.3. Unsatisfactory Analyses.  The commonest objection against EV targets the sample analyses aimed at 
illustrating it.  There are at least three ways to frame this objection. 
First, one could object that these sample analyses sometimes feature thin concepts where non-
evaluative concepts should appear.  In the analysis of courageous as true-[to-a-good-cause-despite-risk], the thin 
concept good appears in the extra content.  However, it’s a mistake to assume that the extra content cannot 
contain thin concepts.  Elstein and Hurka allow for additional thin concepts to be “embedded” in the non-
evaluative contents of thick concepts (2009, 526).  EV allows for this too.  There’s no reason why 
Separabilists should be restricted to citing only one thin concept, rather two or three or many more. 
 Second, one could worry that these analyses sometimes contain thick terms in the analysans, and so 
do not satisfy Strong Separabilism.  For example, recall that brutal was analyzed as bad-[to-someone-
aggressively]; it might be objected that ‘aggressive’ is a thick term.  However, ‘aggressive’ is not a thick term 
by our account, because the concept aggressive fails the necessary condition for thickness.  One need not 
evince a deficient grasp of aggressive if one thinks that aggressive workouts are not wrong, or not bad in any 
way, etc.  So, aggressive is not thick.   
The term ‘aggressive’ might be thick in a broader sense that allows pragmatically-evaluative terms 
to be thick.  That is, ‘aggressive’ might have an evaluation that’s not semantically encoded but is associated 
via some pragmatic mechanism (e.g. speaker meaning).  But this would not help the objection.  The Strong 
Separabilist version of EV only needs to preclude semantically-evaluative thick terms from appearing in the 
analysans, because semantically-evaluative thick terms are the only terms EV seeks to explain. 
But let’s suppose for the sake of argument that ‘aggressive’ is a semantically-evaluative thick term.  
What are the options?  Proponents of EV could maintain Strong Separabilism by claiming that ‘aggressive’ is 
not needed to express a correct analysis of brutal.  Perhaps another term can be used instead, such as 
‘forceful’.  Or they could propose that aggressive is itself identical to an expanded content of a thin term, and 
then substitute this expanded content for aggressive within the account of brutal.  So, there are options, 
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although none are necessary in the present case, since ‘aggressive’ is not a semantically-evaluative thick 
term. 
The third objection claims that EV must yield incorrect analyses, unless the target thick concepts 
are employed somewhere in the extra content, which would render them circular.  Initially, we can assume 
this objection relies on counterexamples.  Let’s suppose there’s a successful counterexample against the 
analysis of courageous as true-[to-a-good-cause-despite-risk].   
This supposition doesn’t by itself support the objector’s claim.  For all we know, it might be 
possible to state a correct non-circular analysis of courageous, in accord with EV, if we simply reformulate 
the one provided.  To support the objector’s claim, we must also suppose that our language lacks the 
resources to state a plausible reformulation, unless courageous appears in the extra content.  But even this 
supposition doesn’t entail the objector’s claim, since it doesn’t exclude the possibility of us introducing new 
expressions into our language that would help us state a correct non-circular analysis.  Imagine that we can 
introduce a modifying expression ‘φ’ such that courageous is identical to the semantic content of ‘true φ’.  
In this case, courageous would satisfy EV, despite our present suppositions.  To support the objector’s claim, 
it must be argued that ‘φ’ could not be introduced.   
One such argument is unsuccessful.  This argument correctly notes that ‘φ’ must be graspable 
independently of courageous (otherwise the analysis would be circular).  But the argument alleges that ‘φ’ 
cannot be grasped independently of courageous.  And there’s no reason to accept this last claim.  Initially, 
one might accept it because courageous was used to introduce ‘φ’ in the above paragraph.  But this is merely 
a contingent etymological fact about the origin of ‘φ’ in our present context; and we have no reason to 
think such a word couldn’t be introduced in a way that’s not parasitic upon courageous—perhaps a linguistic 
community will happen upon an expression like ‘φ’ without even possessing courageous.  Furthermore, this 
etymological fact doesn’t entail that it’s impossible to grasp ‘φ’ independently of courageous.  To borrow 
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Elijah Millgram’s example, the concept insect was used to introduce ‘debugging’, a computer programmer’s 
term.  But it’s possible to understand ‘debugging’ without even possessing insect (1995, 358-9). 
The hypothesis that we could have an expression such as ‘φ’ may seem reminiscent of Hare’s 
controversial claim that we “could have” an “evaluatively neutral word” that’s coextensive with ‘courageous’ 
(1963, 189).  However, we can reject Hare’s claim while still allowing that ‘φ’ could be introduced.  
Hare’s imagined word is different from ‘φ’ in three ways.  (i) Hare envisions the introduction of a single 
word, whereas ‘φ’ could be a complex expression.  (ii) Hare’s imagined word is wholly non-evaluative, but 
‘φ’ could be partly evaluative.  Since ‘φ’ might be complex, it could contain thin terms.  In this case, ‘φ’ 
would be partly evaluative, and the overall analysis would not compromise Strong Separabilism.  And (iii) 
Hare’s envisioned word is supposed to be coextensive with ‘courageous’, whereas ‘φ’ is not.  Only ‘true 
φ’ would be coextensive with ‘courageous’, but not ‘φ’ itself.  So, the two expressions are importantly 
different.  And the arguments against Hare’s view always target his claims in (ii) and (iii).  Since these 
claims don’t apply to ‘φ’, the counterarguments are irrelevant in the present context.31  It’s thus unclear 
why we must deny that an expression like ‘φ’ could be introduced.  So far, we have no support for the 
objector’s claim that EV cannot supply correct non-circular analyses. 
Another way to support the objector’s claim would be to argue directly for Inseparabilism, rather 
than rely on counterexamples.  Inseparabilism is often supported by considerations such as the denial of thin 
centralism (Williams 1985, 146), the rejection of dependence views (Dancy 1995, 275), an appeal to the 
determinable/determinate relation (Harcourt and Thomas 2013, 24-5), the variability of thick terms 
(Dancy 1995, 276), the ambivalence of thick concepts (Kirchin 2013, 75), the denial of Disentangling 
(Dancy 1995, 276), and the denial of Shapefulness (McDowell 1981, 202).  But these considerations do not 
                                                         
31 These counterarguments involve the shapelessness hypothesis and outrunning data, both of which are discussed in 
§IV.  It’s argued that EV is consistent with both. 
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support Inseparabilism over EV.  We’ve already seen that EV is consistent with them all, except the last 
two.  And in the next section, we will see that even non-cognitivist proponents of EV can reasonably deny 
Disentangling and Shapefulness.  So, these considerations do not support Inseparabilism over EV, and 
therefore cannot support the objector’s claim. 
 
IV. Anti-Disentangling 
IV.1. Argument.  The Anti-Disentangling Argument can now be addressed.32  This argument will be 
advanced with regard to the thick concept kind, although it could be formulated for any thick concept that 
plausibly represents a property.   
Let’s suppose kind represents a property and is constituted by good along with certain non-
evaluative contents, as Separabilists may hold.  This view is vulnerable to the Anti-Disentangling Argument 
if it entails 
Disentangling: The non-evaluative content of kind fully determines what property is represented 
by kind, while good plays no role in determining this.  
 
According to Bernard Williams (1985, 141), Disentangling entails      
Shapefulness: There could be a non-evaluative concept that represents the same property as 
kind.   
 
The Anti-Disentangling Argument challenges both Shapefulness and Disentangling.  It states: If Shapefulness 
is true then an outsider who does not share the insider’s evaluative perspective could know the extension of 
‘kind’ (i.e. by observing the property represented by its non-evaluative content).  But an outsider surely 
could not achieve this—the extension of ‘kind’ cannot be determined without grasping the insiders’ 
evaluative perspective (Williams 1985, 141; Putnam 2002, 37-8; McNaughton 1988, 60-1).  Therefore, 
Shapefulness is false, and so is Disentangling, which entails Shapefulness.   
                                                         
32 I only explain how the argument is typically construed, whether or not this adequately captures McDowell’s original 
version. 
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This paper takes no stand on the truth or falsity of Disentangling or Shapefulness.  It rather focuses 
on whether EV requires anyone to accept these controversial claims.  In §IV.3-IV.4, it’s argued that there’s 
no reason to think EV requires anyone to accept Disentangling.  In §IV.5, a similar claim is advanced 
regarding Shapefulness.  First, however, we must clarify what view is thought to entail Disentangling, and 
how the inference is supposed to go.   
 
IV.2. Non-Cognitivism.  A view that’s commonly thought to entail Disentangling is a particular form of 
non-cognitivism that accepts Separabilism and allows thick concepts to represent properties (Williams 
1985, 141-2; Putnam 2002, 38-9).  Out of all views compatible with EV, this form of non-cognitivism is 
most vulnerable to the Anti-Disentangling Argument.33  So, it will be assumed that if this view can escape 
the argument by accepting EV, then so could cognitivist views.    
To illustrate this view, let’s assume a non-cognitivist accepts 
Representation: The concept kind represents a property.  
Initially, one might think non-cognitivism is inconsistent with Representation, because kind is an evaluative 
concept, and non-cognitivists hold that evaluative concepts cannot represent properties—an apparent 
implication of their distinction between description and evaluation.   
But proponents of the Anti-Disentangling Argument grant that non-cognitivists can avoid this 
problem if they accept Separabilism (Putnam 2002, 36; Roberts 2013, 679).  Non-cognitivists can claim 
that kind is only evaluative in the sense that it’s partly constituted by a thin concept.  For instance, they can 
accept 
Kind-Separabilism: The concept kind is partly constituted by good along with non-evaluative 
contents.  
 
                                                         
33 Mackie is also targeted by the argument, although he’s interpreted as holding that thick concepts are “not ethical or 
normative concepts at all” (Putnam 2002, 36).  Thusly interpreted, Mackie’s view is inconsistent with EV, and will not be 
discussed here. 
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And they can maintain their distinction between description and evaluation by claiming that thin evaluative 
concepts cannot represent properties.  This would include 
Non-Descriptivism: The concept good is incapable of representing a property.  
 
No similar claim would hold for thick concepts like kind.  So, if non-cognitivists accept Kind-Separabilism 
and Non-Descriptivism, they can explain their descriptive/evaluative distinction in a way that’s consistent 
with Representation.   
However, it is the combination of these three claims—Representation, Kind-Separabilism, and 
Non-Descriptivism—that’s the target of the Anti-Disentangling Argument (Roberts 2013, 679).  
Henceforth, any view that accepts all three claims will be called ‘target-non-cognitivism’.   
 One might initially think target-non-cognitivism entails Disentangling, but this inference is not 
valid unless target-non-cognitivism is supplemented with an additional claim.  To be sure, target-non-
cognitivism holds that good cannot represent a property; but this does not automatically entail the crucial 
claim in Disentangling—that good cannot play a role in determining what property is represented by 
another concept (e.g. kind).  So, an additional claim is needed to make the inference valid.   
What’s the additional claim?  One possibility is offered by Debbie Roberts, who observes that non-
cognitivists often accept universalizability.  Roberts states universalizability as follows: 
(U1) If I judge that x is “good in virtue of being T” (where ‘T’ is non-evaluative), I’m “logically 
bound” to judge the same for any y that I judge to be T (2011, 498).  
 
Assuming kind is identical to good-in-virtue-of-being-T, it appears that T would completely determine the 
speaker’s use of ‘kind’.   
As forecasted, Roberts is here assuming Separabilists should accept a dependence view.  But if kind 
is a treatment concept, in accord with EV, it needn’t be identical to any concept like good-in-virtue-of-being-
T.  It’s rather identical to something like good-[to-someone-as-an-end].  In this case, (U1) might be true, but it 
would imply nothing about the proper usage of ‘kind’.   
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Furthermore, there’s no feasible way of revising (U1) to accommodate the view that kind is 
identical to good-[to-someone-as-an-end].  Here’s one attempt: 
(U2) If I judge that x is good to someone as an end, I’m logically bound to judge the same for 
any y that I judge to be someone who is treated as an end.34   
 
(U2) is false.  Suppose I judge that a woman is good to someone as an end, and I also judge that her abusive 
spouse is the person she is treating as an end.  Clearly, I’m not thereby required to judge that her abusive 
spouse is also good to someone as an end.  Another revision goes like this:  
(U3) If I judge that x is good to someone as an end, I’m logically bound to judge the same for 
any y that’s non-evaluatively similar to x.   
 
Although (U3) is plausible, it fails to support Disentangling.  At a minimum, the non-evaluative similarity 
between x and y guarantees that y falls under the bracketed content—[to-someone-as-an-end]—in the same 
way as x.  In other words, it guarantees that y also treats someone as an end.  But one way for y to treat 
someone as an end is for y to be bad to someone as an end.35  So, the bracketed non-evaluative content does 
not by itself require me to judge that y is good to someone as an end, even if I judge this for x.  Of course, 
the non-evaluative similarity between x and y involves other features too—features that aren’t encoded in 
the bracketed non-evaluative content, but which may entail that y is good to someone as an end.  But here 
we’re allowing features that aren’t encoded in the bracketed non-evaluative content to play a role in 
determining the application of the whole concept good-[to-someone-as-an-end] (i.e. kind).  We thus lose our 
support for Disentangling.  In short, universalizability does not force Disentangling upon target-non-
cognitivists who accept EV.  
                                                         
34 It’s not immediately clear what sorts of individuals can be recipients of kindness—e.g. they cannot be inanimate 
objects, but what about non-sentient beings (e.g. plants)?  Since this makes no difference to my present argument, I leave the 
question open. 
35 For our purposes, ‘treating someone as an end’ is non-evaluative, since it merely expresses the bracketed non-
evaluative content.  As clarified in §II.3, the phrase simply means that the treatment is intentional and isn’t solely aimed at some 
further end—in this sense, sadistic acts often treat someone as an end.  Clearly this is different from the Kantian slogan (i.e. 
treating people as ends in themselves).   
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But the inference from target-non-cognitivism to Disentangling could be supplemented with a 
different claim.  In explaining the Anti-Disentangling Argument, Stephan Burton writes 
If that distinction [between description and evaluation] is to be maintained, no such apparently 
cognitive role can be allowed for the purely evaluative component of thick evaluative concepts.  
 
By ‘apparently cognitive role’, Burton means the role that constituent thin concepts would play if they 
determined “what falls under some thick evaluative concept” (1992, 30).  So, the above passage can be 
interpreted as follows: if thin concepts are incapable of representing properties (as required by the 
description-evaluation distinction), they cannot play a role in determining what property is represented by 
thick concepts that contain them.  The relevant instance of this is as follows: 
Neglected Premise: If good is incapable of representing a property, then good cannot play a role 
in determining what property is represented by concepts that contain it. 
 
It appears that target-non-cognitivism and Neglected Premise jointly entail Disentangling.  And, in contrast 
to Roberts’ approach, Neglected Premise would not be rendered irrelevant if target-non-cognitivists 
accepted EV.  It will thus be assumed that Neglected Premise is an integral part of the inference.   
Neglected Premise is initially plausible.36  But it will be argued that, if EV is true of kind, then 
target-non-cognitivists have no reason to accept Neglected Premise.  Even if good is incapable of 
representing a property, there’s no reason why good cannot play a role in determining what property is 
represented by expanded contents of ‘good’ (e.g. kind).  The precedence for this idea comes from the 
notion of a semantically incomplete predicate.   
 
                                                         
36 It’s doubtful that Blackburn’s ‘fat↓’ is problematic for claims like Neglected Premise.  See Väyrynen (2013, 163-4) 
and Dancy (1995, 271). 
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IV.3. Incompleteness.  Incompleteness is arguably a feature of both sentences and predicates.37  This section 
focuses on incomplete predicates, and distinguishes two forms of incompleteness—contextual and 
semantic.     
According to Zoltan Szabó, an incomplete predicate is one that “is associated with a set of 
individuals [i.e. an extension] only if additional information is provided” (2001, 133).  Since a predicate 
cannot represent a property unless the predicate has an extension, we can spell out Szabó’s account as 
follows: an incomplete predicate is one that represents a property only if additional information is supplied.  
By ‘additional information’ Szabó means information that’s not solely specified by the sentence containing 
the incomplete predicate, but which would count as part of the predicate’s semantic content (2001, 34).   
Incomplete predicates are arguably widespread, possibly including evaluative adjectives (e.g. 
‘good’), color adjectives (e.g. ‘green’), and others (e.g. ‘late’).  For simplicity, let’s focus on the non-
evaluative predicates in (4) and (5) below, which are common examples: 
(4) Tipper is ready. 
(5) Hughes is tall. 
 
What property, if any, is represented by ‘ready’ in (4)?  There are indefinitely many candidates—e.g. the 
property of being ready to work, ready to dance, ready to eat, etc.  But (4) fails to indicate which property 
is had by Tipper.  It appears to need additional information that would specify an event for which Tipper is 
ready.  Likewise, there are indefinitely many properties corresponding to ‘tall’ in (5)—e.g. the property of 
being tall for a basketball player, tall for a jockey, tall for a human, etc.  And (5) fails to indicate which one 
is had by Hughes.  (5) appears to need information that would specify a comparison class.    
                                                         
37 Incomplete sentences are appealed to by Bach (2012, 163-4) and Soames (2008, 456; 2010, 155-6).  Adherents of 
incomplete predicates include Szabó (2001) and Finlay (2014, 20). 
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In the absence of additional information, there may be no suitable property that could be 
represented by the predicates in (4) and (5).  Herman Cappelen and Ernie Lepore (2005, 166) hold that the 
occurrence of ‘ready’ in (4) picks out  
R: the property of being ready.   
But their view appears to entail a contradiction (Borg 2007, 350-1).  Cappelen and Lepore agree that if 
Tipper is ready to eat then she has R (2005, 167).  Similarly, Tipper should lack R if she’s not ready for an 
exam.  But it’s possible that Tipper is both ready to eat and not ready for an exam.  So, Tipper has R and 
lacks R.  To avoid such contradictions, Emma Borg replaces R with an existentially-quantified property 
(2007, 351):  
R*: the property of being ready for something.   
The trouble is that everything apparently has R*.  As long as Tipper is ready for her next breath, she has 
R*, which means, oddly enough, that (4) is true throughout Tipper’s entire life.  Similar problems arise for 
(5).  These problems merely serve to illustrate why philosophers appeal to incomplete predicates; nothing 
in our discussion hangs on them.38 
Assuming there are incomplete predicates, we can distinguish two ways in which a predicate might 
be incomplete.  Recall the general account of an incomplete predicate—a predicate that represents a 
property only if supplemented with additional information that would be part of its semantic content.  One 
option is to hold that the additional information can be provided.  For example, one might hold that the 
context of utterance supplies such information (Szabó 2001, 133-4).  On this view, the incomplete 
predicate would only be contextually incomplete.  Another option, however, is to deny that such additional 
information can be provided.  From this, it follows that the incomplete predicate fails to represent a 
                                                         
38 And there are other reasons for ascribing incompleteness to a given predicate.  See Szabó (2001). 
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property (Bach 2012, 163-4; Soames 2008, 456; 2010, 155-6).39  On this view, the incomplete predicate is 
semantically incomplete.   
Our sole focus will be on semantic incompleteness.  If an incomplete predicate is semantically 
incomplete, it doesn’t represent a property at all.  The needed additional information is not determined by 
anything in the domain of semantics, not even by context.  Kent Bach, for example, denies that context can 
determine any additional information that would be part of the semantic content of the predicates in (4) and 
(5).  He thereby denies that these predicates can represent properties (2006, 438-9; 2012, 161-5).   
Why can’t context determine semantic contents for incomplete predicates?  For Bach, the only 
kind of context that can determine semantic contents for an expression is “narrow context,” which includes 
objective facts, like the speaker’s identity and time of utterance, but excludes the speaker’s intention.  As 
such, narrow context can determine the semantic contents of automatic indexicals (e.g. ‘I’ and ‘today’) 
which refer independently of the speaker’s intention.  But sentences like (4) contain no automatic 
indexicals.  And there appear to be no objective facts that could determine the property of being ready to 
eat, rather than ready to dance, as the semantic content of (4).  Perhaps one of these properties is what the 
speaker intends to ascribe.  But according to Bach, the speaker’s intention only determines “what the 
speaker means, not the [semantic] contents of expressions the speaker uses” (2012, 166).   
What are the semantic contents of semantically incomplete predicates?  Bach is silent on this 
question, but others call them “pro-concepts”.  Pro-concepts are semantic contents that cannot represent 
properties or individuals, or act as constituents of thought, unless they’re “fleshed out” with additional 
content (Wilson 2011, 15-6). 
It’s crucial to note that the semantic incompleteness of a predicate doesn’t entail that all augmented 
versions of the predicate fail to represent properties.  Bach holds that the occurrence of ‘tall’ in (5) is 
                                                         
39 Bach and Soames are primarily concerned with semantically incomplete sentences, not predicates.  I assume their 
claims apply analogously to predicates. 
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semantically incomplete and thus cannot represent a property.  But he also holds that there are augmented 
versions of this predicate, like ‘tall for a jockey’, that do represent properties (2012, 171).  This augmented 
version provides additional information that the truncated version fails to provide.  But notice that the 
augmented predicate—‘tall for a jockey’—is the result of adding a modifier to ‘tall’.  So, the semantic 
content of this augmented version is an expanded content of ‘tall’.  Thus, Bach’s view entails that some 
predicates fail to represent properties even though they have expanded contents that do not thusly fail.   
For argument’s sake, let’s suppose Bach is right that tall-[for-a-jockey] represents a property even 
though tall does not.  This entails that tall must play a role in determining what property is represented by 
tall-[for-a-jockey].  To see why, assume for reductio that tall plays no role in determining what property is 
represented by tall-[for-a-jockey].  In this case, a similar claim would hold for short—that is, short plays no 
role in determining what property is represented by short-[for-a-jockey].  And these two claims entail an 
absurdity—that tall-[for-a-jockey] represents the same property as short-[for-a-jockey].  After all, the only 
difference between these two expanded contents is that one contains tall while the other contains short.  
Thus, assuming Bach is right, we must conclude that tall plays a role in determining what property is 
represented by tall-[for-a-jockey], even if tall doesn’t represent a property by itself.   
We now have the makings of a counterexample to Neglected Premise.  The above considerations 
about semantic incompleteness entail 
Bach’s Schema 
There is a predicate P such that P’s semantic content (i) does not represent a property but (ii) 
does play a role in determining what property is represented by an expanded content of P.   
 
It should be clear that, if ‘good’ satisfies Bach’s Schema, then Neglected Premise is false.   
This paper, however, does not establish the controversial claim that ‘good’ actually satisfies Bach’s 
Schema.  In the next section, I merely argue that target-non-cognitivists have no reason to deny that ‘good’ 
satisfies Bach’s Schema (regardless of whether they have reason to accept it).  This modest conclusion is 
enough to show that target-non-cognitivists are not required to accept Neglected Premise or Disentangling.  
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To be clear, the argument for this modest conclusion doesn’t rely on an analogy between ‘good’ 
and ‘ready’ or ‘tall’.  To see why, we can suppose, contrary to Bach, that ‘ready’ and ‘tall’ do not actually 
satisfy Bach’s Schema.  This supposition destroys any putative analogy.  But, as we’ll see, the supposition 
leaves the arguments in the next section completely intact; it has no bearing on whether target-non-
cognitivists can reasonably claim that ‘good’ satisfies Bach’s Schema.  So, my challenge to Neglected 
Premise will not rely (even implicitly) on an analogy between ‘good’ and ‘ready’ or ‘tall’.  The above 
discussion of semantic incompleteness is only meant to show that there’s an independent line of thought 
that rejects claims like Neglected Premise.  Whether non-cognitivists can reject Neglected Premise is 
another matter that will be treated separately.         
The next section argues that target-non-cognitivists have no reason to deny that ‘good’ satisfies 
Bach’s Schema.  It’s important to note that target-non-cognitivists are already committed to the view that 
‘good’ satisfies clause (i) of Bach’s Schema.  This is due to their acceptance of Non-Descriptivism.  So, for 
our purposes, we can ignore any arguments denying that ‘good’ satisfies (i).  These would be separate 
arguments against Non-Descriptivism, and the Anti-Disentangling Argument is not supposed to depend on 
any such arguments.  We will plainly assume that ‘good’ satisfies (i).  The focus will be on whether target-
non-cognitivists can reasonably claim that ‘good’ also satisfies (ii).   
 
IV.4. Could ‘Good’ Satisfy (ii)?  There are various ways to argue that target-non-cognitivists should deny 
that ‘good’ satisfies (ii).  Seven such arguments, labeled (A)-(G), will be rejected below.   
Argument (A): No predicates satisfy both (i) and (ii) of Bach’s Schema.  So, target-non-cognitivists 
must deny that ‘good’ satisfies (ii), since they’re already committed to its satisfaction of (i).  The primary 
argument for this claim—that no predicates satisfy (i) and (ii)—comes from Cappelen and Lepore (2005, 
ch.5).  They argue that the intuitive support for (i) equally suggests that (ii) is unsatisfied.  For example, 
many people intuit that the occurrence of ‘ready’ in (4) needs additional information specifying an event for 
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which Tipper is ready—let’s call this an incompleteness intuition.  Incompleteness intuitions initially 
suggest that truncated versions of ‘ready’ are semantically incomplete, and thereby satisfy (i).  But one may 
also have incompleteness intuitions about augmented versions, such as ‘ready for school’.  Here, we also 
need additional information—we need to know whether Tipper is ready to begin a school-day or a school-
year, etc.  We could further augment the expression to specify such information.  But, according to 
Cappelen and Lepore, incompleteness intuitions could be adduced for any augmented version.40  Thus, if 
we trust incompleteness intuitions in thinking (i) is satisfied, we should also think that augmented versions 
don’t represent properties, in which case (ii) is unsatisfied. 
If successful, this objection would not establish the desired conclusion that no predicates satisfy 
Bach’s Schema.  It would only show that incompleteness intuitions aren’t good reasons for thinking a 
predicate satisfies Bach’s Schema.  And we can easily grant this conclusion.  That is, we can grant that 
target-non-cognitivists cannot consistently rely on incompleteness intuitions in thinking that ‘good’ satisfies 
(i), unless they also think it fails to satisfy (ii).  But this conclusion is irrelevant, since target-non-cognitivists 
have never relied on incompleteness intuitions in claiming that ‘good’ satisfies (i).  Their reasons are 
entirely different, and are discussed under the next argument. 
Argument (B): Target-non-cognitivists cannot accept that ‘good’ satisfies (ii), because they must 
hold that every expanded content of ‘good’ fails to represent a property.  But why must they hold this?  The 
answer is unclear.  Non-cognitivists can, and often do, restrict their views by only denying that there are 
properties represented by select evaluative concepts, like right, ought, rational, and good.41  Allan Gibbard, 
for example, restricts his view to the concept rational (1990, 8).  Moreover, as noted earlier, target-non-
cognitivists are already committed to a similar restriction—they deny that good represents a property but 
                                                         
40 Bach denies this claim (2012, 177-8). 
41 Ayer is an exception—see Argument (D). 
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allow kind to represent a property.  These restricted forms of non-cognitivism do not automatically prohibit 
expanded contents of ‘good’ from representing properties.   
To be sure, the claim that good is incapable of representing a property is typically motivated by 
considerations such as Moore’s open-question argument, Mackie’s queerness argument, motivational 
internalism, and supervenience.  Do these arguments also imply that expanded contents of ‘good’ fail to 
represent properties?  Without going into detail, suffice it to say that target-non-cognitivists must hold that 
these arguments are unpersuasive with regard to good-[to-someone-as-an-end], even if they are persuasive for 
good.  After all, they must hold that such arguments do not support the claim that kind fails to represent a 
property, since they accept Representation.  And there’s no reason to treat kind any differently from good-
[to-someone-as-an-end], when it comes to these arguments.  So, it seems that a principled non-cognitivist 
who accepts Representation, despite the above arguments, is not precluded from holding that good-[to-
someone-as-an-end] represents a property.   
Argument (C): If ‘good’ satisfies (ii) then good plays a role in determining what property is 
represented by another concept C that contains good.  But if good plays such a role, then there exists an 
evaluative property—the property represented by C.  And non-cognitivists cannot allow evaluative 
properties.   
However, the claim that good helps determine what property is represented by C doesn’t entail that 
there exists an evaluative property.  All it entails is that the property actually represented by C is different 
from what would have been represented if good was not a constituent of C.  The mere fact that C would 
have represented a different property doesn’t entail that there are evaluative properties.   
Of course, one could supplement Argument (C) with an additional claim: all properties 
represented by evaluative concepts are thereby evaluative properties.  This would guarantee that the 
property represented by C is evaluative.  But this additional claim is incompatible with target-non-
cognitivism, regardless of whether ‘good’ satisfies (ii).  Notice that this claim would commit target-non-
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cognitivism to the existence of evaluative properties merely by virtue of Representation, since kind is an 
evaluative concept that represents a property.  So, there’s an independent reason for why target-non-
cognitivists must reject the additional claim; it therefore cannot provide them with reason to deny that 
‘good’ satisfies (ii).42 
Argument (D): Bach’s Schema was supported by the need to avoid an absurdity—that tall-[for-a-
jockey] represents the same property as short-[for-a-jockey].  But target-non-cognitivists should embrace the 
alleged absurdity when it comes to good.  They should admit that good-[to-someone as-an-end] represents the 
same property as bad-[to-someone as-an-end]—both concepts represent a non-evaluative property (e.g. the 
property of treating someone as an end).   
It’s true that some non-cognitivists embrace this approach.  A.J. Ayer, for instance, holds that 
“[t]he presence of an ethical symbol in a proposition adds nothing to its factual content.”  Let’s call this 
Ayer’s Commitment.  Ayer’s Commitment implies that good-[to-someone-as-an-end] represents the same 
property as bad-[to-someone-as-an-end], since good and bad add nothing to factual content.43  But the question 
is whether there’s any reason to accept Ayer’s Commitment.  One reason might be Argument (C) from 
above, which has been rejected.  Ayer himself has a different reason—he claims that Ayer’s Commitment 
explains the supposed fact that good is “irreducible to empirical concepts” (1946, 106-7).  The trouble is that 
Non-Descriptivism by itself explains this supposed fact (since empirical concepts are capable of representing 
properties).  So, it’s unclear why Ayer’s Commitment should be accepted in addition to Non-
Descriptivism.   
It’s also worth noting that Ayer is not a target-non-cognitivist.  He extends his non-cognitivism to 
“all normative ethical symbols,” and thereby denies that there are properties represented by ‘virtue’, 
                                                         
42 Broadly speaking, target-non-cognitivists must take the evaluative to be solely a feature of concepts and/or terms, 
not of properties—unless perhaps they go deflationist about properties.  See Eklund (2013) for other problems with the 
additional claim. 
43 Judging from Ayer’s examples, he would likely agree that these expanded contents have some factual content (1946, 
107). 
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‘beautiful’, and ‘hideous’ (1946, 108-13).  These are thick terms.  So, Ayer would reject Representation, 
and is therefore not the target of the Anti-Disentangling Argument.  McDowell agrees (1981, 217 fn. 29).       
Argument (E): The only explanation for why ‘good’ would satisfy Bach’s Schema is that its 
semantic content is a pro-concept—a concept that cannot represent a property unless it’s combined with 
additional content.  But target-non-cognitivists are committed to a view that’s incompatible with the pro-
concept explanation.  On their view, ‘good’ expresses an attitude or an emotion or has non-descriptive 
illocutionary force (e.g. in the prescriptive mood).   
Contrary to this objection, non-cognitivism is consistent with the pro-concept explanation.  By 
itself, the pro-concept explanation entails nothing about what kind of psychological state (if any) is 
expressed by uses of a predicate, or about what kind of illocutionary force the utterances have.  So, the pro-
concept explanation could in principle be combined with target-non-cognitivism.  For instance, consider 
C.L. Stevenson’s view that “[t]he emotive meaning of a word is a tendency of a word, arising through the 
history of its usage, to produce (result from) affective responses in people” (1937, 23).  Clearly, a word 
whose semantic content is a pro-concept could also have a tendency to produce (or result from) affective 
responses in people, and could thus have emotive meaning.  Thus, Stevenson’s theory is consistent with the 
pro-concept explanation.  Of course, contemporary expressivists make a stronger claim than what 
Stevenson makes—they claim the semantic content of ‘good’ is constituted by an attitude.  But this is also 
compatible with the pro-concept explanation, in at least two ways.  The first is that the semantic content of 
‘good’ could be constituted by both an attitude and a pro-concept.  Expressivists need not claim that the 
attitude is the only thing constituting the semantic content of ‘good’.44  And the pro-concept explanation 
need not claim that a pro-concept is the only thing constituting the semantic content of ‘good’.  A second 
                                                         
44 Otherwise, hybrid-expressivism wouldn’t be a form of expressivism.  For example, Michael Ridge’s ecumenical 
expressivism holds that the semantic contents of ethical claims are constituted by attitudes and beliefs (2006).  The view 
mentioned above is weaker in that the extra element is not a belief or a proposition, but a pro-concept (which doesn’t represent a 
property). 
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option would be to claim that the attitude expressed by ‘good’ just is a pro-concept.  If attitudes can be 
semantic contents, as expressivists claim, I see no reason why they couldn’t be the sort of semantic contents 
that linguists have labeled pro-concepts. 
Argument (F): If ‘good’ satisfies (ii), then there are properties such as goodness-to-someone-as-an-
end.  And if there are such properties, then there’s also a property of being good-in-some-way, since the 
latter merely quantifies over the former.  But target-non-cognitivists cannot allow for any such property as 
goodness-in-some-way.   
In reply, target-non-cognitivists can allow for the existence of goodness-in-some-way, provided EV 
is true.  If EV is true, then goodness-in-some-way is merely a property that existentially quantifies over 
properties that target-non-cognitivists already accept.  Target-non-cognitivists already accept the property 
of kindness, given their acceptance of Representation.  And according to EV, kindness is identical to a 
property such as goodness-to-someone-as-an-end.  So, goodness-in-some-way existentially quantifies over 
kindness, a property already countenanced by target-non-cognitivists.  There’s no reason for them to deny a 
property that merely existentially-quantifies over properties they already accept. 
It’s worth noting that the property of being good-in-some-way is distinct from any such property as 
goodness (or goodness-simpliciter).  The former can be inferred through a single use of existential-
introduction, as Argument (F) assumes; the latter cannot be thusly inferred.  Moreover, the former is 
possessed by nearly everything (Thomson 2008, 10); the latter is not.  Given that they are distinct, it’s 
consistent for target-non-cognitivists to reject the existence of goodness (or goodness-simpliciter), and yet 
accept goodness-in-some-way.  This position would not be unique to target-non-cognitivism—it’s shared 
by Judith Thomson, who is discussed next.  
Argument (G): If target-non-cognitivists claim that ‘good’ satisfies (ii), then there’s nothing 
distinctive about their view.  Judith Thomson writes 
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It is consistent to think both that there is no such property as goodness and that there is such a 
property as being a good umbrella—indeed, that is exactly the view I invite you to accept […]   
But if [the expressivist] thinks that all is well with the property being a good umbrella, then 
what is distinctive about his Expressivism?  There isn’t much meat in it (2008, 38). 
 
This worry can easily be framed with regard to the property of being good to someone as an end.  
Thomson’s concern is that there’s nothing distinctive about the sort of expressivism that accepts such a 
property, since Thomson herself accepts it and she’s not an expressivist.   
It’s worth noting that even if target-non-cognitivism couldn’t be distinguished from Thomson’s 
view, this would be just as much a problem for Thomson as it is for target-non-cognitivism.  Nevertheless, 
there is an important difference.  For target-non-cognitivists, the truncated predicate ‘good’ is incapable of 
representing a property.  For Thomson, however, this truncated predicate can represent a property relative 
to context—it can represent a specific property, such as being a good umbrella or being good to someone 
as an end.  For Thomson, context partly determines which of these specific properties is represented by the 
truncated predicate ‘good’ (2008, 32). 
To sum up, we’ve seen that there’s no reason for target-non-cognitivists to deny that ‘good’ 
satisfies clause (ii) of Bach’s Schema.  This means that there’s no reason for them to accept Neglected 
Premise or Disentangling.  Furthermore, we now have a potential model for how good can play a role in 
determining what property is represented by kind even if good cannot represent a property by itself.  If EV is 
true, then kind is identical to an expanded content of ‘good’.  And the suggested model allows that good can 
help determine what property is represented by expanded contents of ‘good’ even if good can’t represent a 
property by itself.   
 
IV.5. Shapefulness.  Even if proponents of EV need not accept Disentangling, they may be vulnerable to the 
Anti-Disentangling Argument if they accept Shapefulness for reasons other than Disentangling.  I cannot 
examine all potential reasons for Shapefulness here.  But I can show that no such reasons arise from EV per 
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se.  This section establishes that EV does not entail Shapefulness, and that proponents of EV can accept a 
primary argument against Shapefulness, based on outrunning data.   
It’s worth noting that the denial of Shapefulness is an instance of the shapelessness hypothesis—the 
claim that no non-evaluative concept could represent the same property as a thick concept (Roberts 2011, 
505).  This section therefore reveals that EV is consistent with the shapelessness hypothesis. 
Can proponents of EV deny Shapefulness?  Roberts has argued that some dependence views entail 
Shapefulness, independently of Disentangling (2011, 507; 2013, 682).  But EV is a form of Separabilism 
that does not entail Shapefulness.  Consider our sample instance of EV, where kind is identical to good-[to-
someone-as-an-end].  This sort of account does not involve any non-evaluative concepts that would be 
sufficient for kind.  Good-[to-someone-as-an-end] is an evaluative concept, and as far as EV is concerned, it may 
be the only concept that is sufficient for kind.  Therefore, EV doesn’t require that there could be a non-
evaluative concept that represents the same property as kind, and so doesn’t require Shapefulness.   
To solidify this, notice that proponents of EV can accept a primary argument against Shapefulness.  
The rejection of Shapefulness is often motivated by the claim that extensions of thick concepts outrun non-
evaluative classifications.  Kirchin writes 
Just think about the various types of kind action there are: opening doors for people, telling the 
truth, telling a “white” lie, giving someone some sweets, refraining from giving sweets for some 
other reason, and so on (2010, 5). 
 
Kirchin then spells out the example of giving “sweets” as follows: 
[I]t might be cruel to refrain from sharing chocolate with a young child who desperately wants 
it, but it can be kind if, in addition, we are acting because there is some risk of her teeth rotting 
in the future.  In more complicated situations it might be kinder to share, despite the risk of 
tooth rot, because, say, someone has hurt her feelings and she needs comforting (2010, 6).     
 
Since our judgments about kindness are affected by non-evaluative modifications that could go on 
indefinitely, it might seem unlikely for there to be a non-evaluative concept that represents the same 
property as kind.  This may initially support the rejection of Shapefulness. 
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But the same argument could be accepted by proponents of EV.  Notice that Kirchin’s examples 
equally affect our judgments about whether the action would be good to someone as an end.  If there’s 
serious risk of tooth-decay and the child needs no comforting, then refraining from sharing the chocolate 
could be good to the child as an end (depending on one’s intention).  Similarly, opening a door for 
someone, telling the truth, or telling a white lie, could also be good to that person as an end, depending on 
one’s intention.  Thus, the sort of data that calls Shapefulness into doubt is just as persuasive if kind is 
identical to good-[to-someone-as-an-end].  Proponents of EV can accept the outrunning argument against 
Shapefulness.  Whether this argument adequately supports the rejection of Shapefulness is another matter, 
as Kirchin himself points out (2010).     
Despite the outrunning data, there might be reasons for accepting Shapefulness, which have nothing 
to do with Disentangling or EV.  But the modest point of this section stands: EV does not by itself require 
Shapefulness.  It should be noted, however, that EV also does not prohibit anyone from accepting 
Shapefulness.  One could, for example, claim that good-[to-someone-as-an-end] (i.e. kind) represents the same 
property as a non-evaluative concept, like increases-another’s-happiness-as-an-end.  This sort of claim is 
perfectly open to proponents of EV, but not forced on them.   
 
IV.6. Conclusion.  This paper has explained and defended a new Separabilist account—the Expansion View 
(or EV)—which holds that thick concepts are expanded contents of thin terms.  We’ve seen that EV is 
distinct from the only kind of Separabilism taken seriously in the literature, and that it has many features 
that Inseparabilists want from an account of thick concepts.  Most notably, EV provides proponents with a 
new strategy to avoid Disentangling: they can allow thin concepts to play a role in determining what 
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properties are represented by thick concepts, even if thin concepts don’t represent properties by 
themselves.45 
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